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“Il n’y a pas de chats”:  
Feline Absence and/as the Space of Zoopoetics
Everyday language calls a cat a cat, as if the living cat and its name 
were identical, as if it were not true that when we name the cat, we 
retain nothing of it but its absence, what it is not. (Blanchot 325)
1. Asymptote 
In 1920, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote the preface to Mitsou, a collection of 
forty black ink drawings by Balthasar Klossowki, better known as Balthus 
(or Baltusz), the eleven-year-old son of the artist Elizabeth “Baladine” Klos-
sowska, who was Rilke’s lover at the time. The drawings tell the story of 
how young Balthus finds a stray tomcat, whom he names Mitsou. The two 
engage in carefree cross-species companionship, and the occasional bit of 
mischief, until one day Mitsou runs away and is never seen again. Balthus 
searches in vain for the missing cat and the final image shows him, weep-
ing and abandoned, in his now-empty room. Rilke was so taken with these 
drawings that he promptly arranged for them to be published.
The rather whimsical preface, which he wrote in French, is remarkable 
not only as a document of Rilke’s zoopoetics, and indeed of zoopoetics more 
generally, but also, and this is what makes it particularly relevant to the 
present volume, for the way it weaves together the question of the animal 
and the question of language and artistic representation with the problem 
of the world or worlds inhabited by humans and nonhumans. In this way, 
the text may serve as an invitation to consider how zoopoetics and ecopoet-
ics—conceived as creative, multispecies engagements with more-than-human 
forms of life and the environments in which “we” dwell—are unavoidably 
and productively entangled.
The preface begins as follows: “Does anyone know cats? Do you, for 
example, think that you do? I must admit that I have never considered their 
existence to be more than a fairly bold hypothesis” (9).1 In order for animals 
1 There are, to my knowledge, three published translations of this text into English—by 
Richard Miller, Stephen Mitchell, and Damion Searls, respectively. I have opted to refer 
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to “share our world,” he continues, they must somehow “participate in it,” 
if only a little. Dogs, for instance, appear to inhabit a world related to our 
own, a fact which is evident in the determination with which they acknowl-
edge our presence, even if it forces them to live “at the very limits of their 
nature” to the point that they appear to have “abandoned their most primal 
canine traditions” in favor of seeking admittance into our world. This is 
what makes them “tragic and sublime” (9). Dogs, Rilke feels, are always on 
the cusp of leaving their canine world behind completely and joining us in 
ours, at which point they would cease to be dogs altogether.
Cats, by contrast, are simply cats, and they show no ambition to become 
anything else, least of all for our sake: “Their world is utterly, through and 
through, a cat’s world” (9). What is more, there is no overlap between this 
feline world and the world of men. Certain individuals, Rilke grants, are 
occasionally admitted into the presence of cats, but even these fortunate 
ones will inevitably find themselves “rejected and denied,” banned from 
ente ring the cats’ world, “a world which they inhabit exclusively, surrounded 
by circumstances that none of us can ever guess” (10). Hence, even if you 
think your cat is looking at you—in the morning, in the bathroom, say—in 
fact you cannot be certain that she has ever truly deigned to register your 
“futile image” on the surface of her retina. If there is any reciprocity in this 
relationship, it lies in the fact that cats seem to find our existence equally 
implausible as Rilke does theirs:
Has man ever been their contemporary? I doubt it. And I can assure you that 
sometimes, in the twilight, the cat next door pounces across and through my body 
[à travers mon corps], either unaware of me or to prove to the dumbfounded things 
[choses ahuries] that I really don’t exist. (10)
The preface as a whole is written in the spirit of consolation for the loss 
of the kitten. This consolation proceeds along two separate and seemingly 
irreconcilable lines of argument, both of which concern the impossibility 
of losing a cat: On the one hand, Rilke implies that the reason you cannot 
really lose a cat is that, in fact, cats do not exist, and hence it is impossible 
ever to have found one in the first place. Interestingly, this form of consola-
to Miller’s translation, which is the most fluent. This is in part because it is freer than 
the other two, which also unfortunately makes it somewhat inaccurate in places. Miller 
inexplicably changes Mitsou’s gender from male to female, for instance, and there are 
various other idiosyncrasies in the text. I have thus taken the liberty of silently amend-
ing or modifying it in order to preserve a specific nuance, supplying the original French 
wherever necessary.
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tion is aimed not at young Balthus, who, in producing these forty drawings, 
has evidently been able to work through his loss and thus “fulfilled [his] 
obligation” to the absent feline; rather, it is the reader, whose final image of 
Balthus remains that of the forlorn child, “bathed in tears at the end of [the] 
book,” who must be reassured. Thus, the preface concludes on the follow-
ing enigmatic note: “Don’t worry: I am [je suis]. Baltusz exists. Our world is 
sound. // There are no cats [il n’y a pas de chats]” (13).
On the other hand, Rilke writes that even if you do find a cat—which 
would imply that there are, in fact, cats to be found, even if, as he puts it, 
finding a cat is “unheard of” (12)—owing to the asymptotic noncontempo-
raneity of the human and feline worlds, a cat never truly becomes part of 
your life, and hence it was never your cat to lose in the first place. Instead, the 
relationship between owner and cat can only be expressed in the irreducible 
formula “life + a cat”, a formula which, Rilke writes, “adds up to an incal-
culable sum” (12). It produces a surplus which persists even once one has 
lost the cat again, and which renders that loss impossible. This surplus, this 
palpable absence, is what Balthus has transformed into his forty drawings:
No one has ever lost a cat. Can one lose a cat, a living thing, a living being, a life? 
But to lose a life: is death [c’est la mort]! . . .
Finding, losing. Have you really thought what loss is? … [L]oss, cruel though it 
may be, cannot prevail over possession; it can, if you like, terminate it; it affirms 
it; in the end it is like a second acquisition, but this time wholly internal, intense 
in a different way.
Of course, you felt this, Baltusz. No longer seeing Mitsou, you set about seeing 
him even more.
Is he still alive? He lives within you, and his insouciant kitten’s frolics that once 
diverted you now compel you: you fulfilled your obligation through your labori-
ous sorrow. (12-13)
This “laborious sorrow” is a poietic response to the absence, to the loss of 
the other, which is always singular and irreplaceable, and whose death, to 
quote Jacques Derrida, marks not just the end of a world or of someone in 
the world, but “each time singularly,” “irreplaceably,” “infinitely,” and “in 
defiance of arithmetic”—an “incalculable sum” indeed!—the absolute “end 
of the world” (“Rams” 140). This casts Rilke’s reassurance that “our world 
is sound” in a somewhat different light, since this world is no longer the 
same as it was before Balthus found the cat, and neither is the “we” whose 
world is now declared sound. The soundness and solidity of “our” world is 
something that must be produced, in the face of feline absence, through the 
work of mourning.
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Even though the cat was never fully part of our world, its absence leaves 
behind “a gap in the world,” to borrow a phrase from D. H. Lawrence’s 
“Mountain Lion,” which is itself a roughly contemporary rumination on 
feline absence. Nor is it the only text from this period in which feline ab-
sence—both literal and figurative, actual and hypothetical—plays a central 
role. It seems everywhere you look, cats are not there. This “gap” might be 
regarded as the space of zoopoetics, particularly since, as we shall see, this 
palpable absence begins to serve as a sort of master trope for engagements 
with fundamental questions regarding the relationship between word and 
world. As such, it mediates between the three key terms that animate the 
present volume, namely texts, animals, and environments.
2. Casual2
In 1939, Gertrude Stein published a book, ostensibly for children, entitled 
The World Is Round. It is about a girl named, inevitably, Rose, who has a 
dog named Love and a cousin named Willie, who has a lion named Billie. 
Chapter eight, entitled “Rose Thinking,” consists of a single sentence: “If 
the world is round would a lion fall off” (25). This enigmatic and rather 
whimsical thought raises many questions, but I will limit myself to the fol-
lowing: the absence of a question mark, here as elsewhere in the text, makes 
it ambiguous how this sentence is to be read, and this ambiguity also begins 
to trouble the constative force of the book’s title, inviting us to ask whether 
the world really is round, whether this is not to conflate the world with the 
earth, say. But if the world isn’t round, what then? Relatedly, perhaps think-
ing back to Rilke’s take on the issue, we might also question the use of the 
definite article: is there such a thing as the world? Furthermore, how are 
we to interpret the abrupt shift from the indicative (“is”) to the subjunctive 
(“would”)? And finally, if there is such a thing as the world, and if it is in fact 
round, why would a lion in particular be in danger of falling off?
Let’s start with the lion. The title of the first chapter of The World Is Round 
invokes Stein’s most famous phrase, “Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,” 
from the poem “Sacred Emily” (Geography 187). Like many poets of her 
generation, Stein felt that words had become worn out and had lost their 
immediacy, so that now, as she would later put it, when you read or write a 
2 A version of this section was previously published under the heading “World,” in the 
volume Symptoms of the Planetary Condition.
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poem about roses, “you know in your bones that the rose is not there” (Four 
vi). The formula was an attempt to reassert the thingness of words, and hence 
to minimize the distance between the word and the world. Oddly, while we 
are assured at the beginning of The World Is Round that “Rose is a rose” and 
that she “would have been Rose” (1) by any other name as well, her cousin 
Willie’s identity is less secure. Seemingly, this has something to do with 
his lion, who has “a name as well as a mane and that name is Billie” (27). 
Not only are the two names so similar as to invite confusion, neither name 
seems to correspond to its bearer’s inmost identity. This prompts Rose to 
ask herself: “Is a lion not a lion” (21). If a lion is not a lion, would that mean 
that the lion is not “there”?
By a curious coincidence, around the same time Ludwig Wittgenstein was 
also worrying about the proposition “Lion is a lion” and what it meant for 
the place of cats in the world. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus—published, 
as it happens, in 1922, like “Sacred Emily”—Wittgenstein had famously de-
fined the world as “everything that is the case [der Fall]” (31) but in his notes 
from the year 1944, he was moved to revise this definition, seemingly on 
account of the lion.3 According to the Tractatus, a statement can have sense 
only if it represents a state of affairs, i.e., something which is “the case.” 
Thus any and all statements about fictional lions—in fables, for instance—
would be relegated to the realm of nonsense. The Tractatus demands that 
in order for something to be “the case,” and hence in “the world,” it must 
be possible to determine not only that it exists but that it does so in a definite 
number of instances. Consequently, the phrase “Lion is a lion” must be taken 
to be using the word “lion” in two different ways, namely as a name for an 
individual and as a species designation. But in fables, Wittgenstein writes, 
we encounter the lion, not a lion, nor a particular lion named Lion, and thus 
“it actually is as if the species lion came to be seen as a lion” (Remarks 182). 
This leads to a contradiction, because it is impossible to determine whether 
“the Lion” refers to the species or an individual—or indeed whether it is the 
same lion each time—and hence there is no way to ascertain how many lions 
there are at any given moment. The criterion for existence in the world of 
the Tractatus was the avoidance of contradictions: it had to be possible to 
determine whether something is “the case” or not. Now, two decades later, 
Wittgenstein is no longer satisfied with such a definition. “One can exam-
ine an animal to see if it is a cat,” he writes, “but at any rate the concept 
3 My reading here is indebted to Hans Blumenberg’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s “retrac-
tion” in Lions (56-61).
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‘cat’ cannot be examined in this way” (182). Hence, whereas in 1922 he 
would have regarded the proposition that “the class of cats is not a cat” as 
sheer nonsense, now he asks, simply: “How do you know?” (182). How, in 
other words, would one verify such a statement? Even though it “seems like 
nonsense,” Wittgenstein argues that it can be read as a “proper sentence, if 
only it is taken right,” i.e., as a language game involving a different kind of 
certainty than mathematical certainty.
For Wittgenstein, then, the ultimate aim is to re-evaluate the problem of 
certainty, and hence it may seem like little more than a happy coincidence 
that he ends up saving the fabular lion from oblivion in the process. Never-
theless, it does seem as though the threat of feline (or, more precisely, leonine) 
absence was enough to make this most rigorous of philosophers re-evaluate 
one of the core premises of his philosophy and change his definition of “the 
world.”4 From a zoopoetic perspective, this has far-reaching consequences 
(“if only it is taken right”), and I should like to take it as an argument for 
literature as a means of expanding “the world” beyond whatever happens or 
appears to be “the case.”
3. Exorbitant
At a conference in Berlin some years ago, Jonathan Burt remarked that 
animal figures in art are frequently endowed with an “exorbitant potential,” 
which is not exhausted by the philosophical and conceptual gestures that 
accompany them. I find this a particularly apt term for thinking about the 
way in which animals, and cats in particular, gesture always beyond the text 
in a way that renders their absence maximally significant.
Probably the most concise articulation of this mode of absence is to be 
found in Jorge Luis Borges’ poem “El otro tigre” (“The Other Tiger,” 1959), 
which I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Driscoll, “Fearful Symme-
tries”), so I will merely summarize some key points here. The poem opens 
with the speaker imagining a tiger prowling through the jungle, leaving “its 
4 Indeed, we must not forget that it was also in the context of certainty and its relation to 
the language game that just a couple of years later, in 1947, Wittgenstein would make his 
enigmatic postulation that “if a lion could talk, we could not understand him” (PI 223e). 
The double subjunctive is key here: the sentence does not refer to a verifiable “state of 
affairs” at all. If anything, we are being asked not only to imagine a world in which lions 
can talk, but also to confront the limits of our (human, linguistic) understanding and ability 
to respond.
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footprint on the muddy edge / of a river with a name unknown to it”—for 
“in its world, there are no names” (Borges 6-8). By the beginning of the 
second stanza, however, he begins to realize that this tiger is nothing more 
than “a set of literary images” and “scraps remembered from encyclopedias” 
(24-26). Far from following its own path “out of reach of all mythologies” 
(45) the tiger is bound to a path that is always already circumscribed by 
language. Against this “tiger of symbols” (31) the speaker posits the real, 
“hot-blooded” (32) tiger—but in so doing, in naming this “real” tiger and at-
tempting to guess “its nature and its circumstance” (37), it too becomes “a 
fiction, not a living creature” (38). Thus, in the third and final stanza, the 
poet resolves to continue his search for “the other tiger, the one not in this 
poem” (49), even though he knows that this “third tiger” (40) will also be 
a figment of his imagination, an “arrangement of human language” (42). 
The tiger on the page is always a paper tiger—an animot—but the “real” tiger 
which exists only outside the text is itself also a function of the discourse 
that enframes it.
The same of course also goes for what is undoubtedly the most famous 
cat in all of animal studies, namely Derrida’s cat from The Animal That 
Therefore I Am. As the reader will recall, Derrida spends several pages near 
the beginning of his text insisting that he is talking about “a real cat”: “truly, 
believe me, a little cat,” not “the figure of a cat” (6), and certainly not any of a 
whole litany of famous literary and philosophical cats, from E. T. A. Hoff-
mann’s tomcat Murr (6) to “Montaigne’s cat” (6) to “Baudelaire’s family of 
cats” (7), to Rilke’s cats (7), and so forth. But of course, as Derrida knows 
only too well, he doth protest too much. All the insistent deictic specificity he 
can muster (“she and no other, the one I am talking about here”) is not enough 
to isolate this cat from all the others, and nor can he change the irrefragable 
fact that there is no “real cat” in the text. At the same time, he is right to insist that 
the cat is not just a metaphor, or an “ambassador” for “the immense symbolic 
responsibility with which our culture has always charged the feline race” 
(9). Yet, this “symbolic responsibility” cannot be so easily shrugged off. The 
mere fact that Derrida feels the need to go to such great lengths to specify all 
the cats that he is not talking about in order to insist on the “unsubstitutable 
singularity” (9) of “his” cat is itself an indication of the inherent difficulty of 
stripping away the intertextual associations and significances attached to the 
chimerical material-semiotic assemblage that is “Derrida’s cat.”
This might be a good time to recall that “the exorbitant” is also the term 
Derrida uses in Of Grammatology when discussing the question of deconstruc-
tive method, and it is in this context that we find his (in)famous assertion 
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that “there is nothing outside of the text (there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas 
de hors-texte)” (158). From this perspective, the “exorbitant” seems to offer 
a space within the discourse—or rather, it holds out the promise that such 
a space could and must be produced—from which that discourse might be 
deconstructed. The exorbitant names a position within the discourse that 
resists its totalizing order while also avoiding the trap of presuming that there 
is a transcendental, extra-textual position from which to pass judgement: the 
exorbitant reading “cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something 
other than it, toward a referent … outside the text whose content could take 
place, could have taken place outside of language” (158). Although Derrida 
is referring to practices of reading and interpretation here, the same is true 
for representation and writing, not least for zoopoetic writing: Borges’ search 
for the “other tiger” must end in failure, but it is a productive failure, in that 
it ceaselessly pursues the outer limit of the representable and expressible. In 
this way, the “exorbitant” tiger is precisely that which exceeds or occupies a 
position “a little bit outside” (Rilke 12) the orbis, which designates not only 
a track or path (orbita), but the rotation of the Earth and, by extension, the 
world as a whole (orbis terrarum). In other words, Borges’ tiger, like Willie’s 
lion, is exorbitant and hence always in danger of “falling off.” It is poetry 
that seeks to negotiate a space inside language that could encompass this 
exorbitant potential in a way that also expands the boundaries of the world.
Animality is constructed as that which is perennially outside language: 
it is the ultimate hors-texte. Hence we might say that the text is marked by 
an absence that is shaped like an animal—a cat, for instance. And perhaps 
we can begin to see Il n’y a pas de chats as a version of Il n’y a pas de hors-texte. 
The cats and the hors-texte occupy an analogous position in each statement, 
and, indeed, fulfil a similar function, in terms of both representation and 
interpretation. This is important to keep in mind for scholars working in 
literary animal studies, since, again, there are no cats in the texts we study. 
But this needn’t be seen as a lack, or as proof that the cat isn’t “there,” since 
that in turn would serve to reinforce the entire logocentric tradition that 
depends on the exclusion of the animal. But nor can we simply conjure up 
the animal or claim that we are studying or speaking for the animals them-
selves. Instead, we have to be attentive to the gaps and spaces left behind 
by the feline absences in the text, which also includes the myriad ways cats 
and other animals have traditionally been “interpreted out” of texts by 
literary scholarship. Indeed, as Derrida insists, the task would be to arrive 
at “a thinking, however fabulous and chimerical it might be, that thinks the 
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absence of the name and of the word otherwise, and as something other 
than a privation” (Animal 48).
4. Effaniniffable
The naming of cats, as is well known, is a difficult matter. In his celebrated 
poem on the subject—published, as it happens, in 1939, the same year as The 
World Is Round—T. S. Eliot explains that “a cat must have three different 
nAMeS” (4): one for everyday family use; one “that’s peculiar, and more dig-
nified” (14), such as “Munustrap, Quaxo, or Coricopat” (18), which never 
belongs to more than one cat; and finally a secret third name, which “you 
never will guess; / The name that no human research can discover— / But 
the CAt hiMSelf KnoWS, and will never confess” (22-24). Whereas the first 
name is that given to the cat by his or her human companions, it is not yet 
a proper name, since there may be any number of cats by the name of “Peter, 
Augustus, Alonzo or James.” The second name, by contrast, refers only to 
one particular cat, and as such comes closer to being “proper” to that cat, 
but, as is the nature of names, this name too will survive the cat and hence 
pre-ordains the cat’s inevitable disappearance. Only the third name can truly 
be said to belong to the cat, to correspond wholly and without remainder to 
his innermost essence, his true identity, but this is possible only the condition 
that it remain unspoken, unknowable, secret.
When you notice a cat in profound meditation, 
The reason, I tell you, is always the same:
His mind is engaged in a rapt contemplation 
Of the thought, of the thought, of the thought of his name:
His ineffable effable
Effanineffable
Deep and inscrutable singular Name. (25-31)
Evidently, keeping this secret requires significant mental effort on the part 
of the cat, as if his very existence depended on it. This secret is a source of 
fascination and—depending on how we choose to interpret the first two syl-
lables of “effanineffable”—frustration for the poet, who finds himself barred 
from entering this private realm, much in the same way as Rilke is shut out 
from the feline world. The upshot of this circumstance is that whatever we 
may choose to call any particular cat, this name will never truly correspond 
to the cat himself. Moreover, in order to preserve the secret, the cat cannot 
answer to his true name, either, lest he let the cat out of the bag, as it were, 
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and invalidate this name whose essence “is” its secrecy. As a secret, then, it 
is “without content,” to quote Derrida, “without a content separable from 
its performative experience, from its performative tracing” (“Passions” 24); 
in order to remain “proper,” this name is subject to indefinite deferral, and, 
hence, différance. This name is thus precisely not a proper name, which 
would always already be improper, subject to the differential play of the 
trace; rather, it is the absence of the name—that is its secret, and this, too, is a 
species of feline absence.
If there is a zoopoetic force to Eliot’s poem—if, that is, we are to regard it 
as something more than idle, childish, and finally anthropocentric musing on 
a rather domesticated brand of alterity—it lies in the way the repeated insist-
ence on the “thought” of this inscrutable name gestures towards the sort of 
“fabulous and chimerical” thinking that Derrida calls for in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, an animal thinking “that thinks the absence of the name” as 
“something other than a privation” (48). 
How, in this context, might we interpret the nonce word “effanineffa-
ble”? Is it just a playful reduplication of the previous line? “Ineffable” may 
denote either an inability or a prohibition to speak, and derives—like the 
word “fable,” incidentally—from the verb fāri, “to utter.” “Effanineffable” 
appears almost as a synthesis or sublation (Aufhebung) of the terms “effable” 
and “ineffable,” both of which are applied to the cat’s third name, which 
would thus be both utterable and unutterable at the same time. In this sense, 
its functioning would be analogous to khōra, a “third genus” which names 
that which cannot be named and disrupts the logic of binary oppositions: 
it appears at times to be “neither this nor that, at times both this and that,” 
oscillating between “the logic of exclusion and that of participation” but 
belonging to neither—and/or to both (Derrida, “Khōra” 89). The third name 
would thus be both/neither utterable n/or unutterable, both/neither absent 
n/or present. Like Rilke’s cats, it is both “there” and “not there”, remaining 
always “a little bit outside” [il reste un peu en dehors; or: “there is always a little 
bit left over”] (Rilke 12).
Although khōra appears to function like a proper name, it does not, in 
fact, refer to a given entity; rather, it appears to denote, among other things, 
a space or a place, and more specifically an interstitial space between entities—
an abyssal limit—and, moreover, that which “gives place” to those entities 
and their actions while simultaneously serving as a container or receptacle 
for them. In order to capture this ambiguity, in his discussion of the term, 
Derrida refers to khōra as a mi-lieu (116), a half-place, a place that is half-
way—but of course milieu also means “environment,” which we might now 
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be in a position to think of as not only the setting for an encounter between 
animality and textuality but more fundamentally as that which “gives place” 
to that encounter. It is, if I may be permitted to speak in such terms, the “y” 
in il n’y a pas de chats. 
5. Irresponsible
One of the most surprising, indeed alarming, moments in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am comes in the middle of the aforementioned passage in which 
Derrida enumerates all the various literary and philosophical cats that he 
is not talking about. Having just assured his listeners that his singular cat 
is also definitely not the cat in Alice in Wonderland, Derrida adds that, if they 
want, they can choose to hear his “emphasis on ‘really a little cat’ as a quote 
from chapter 11 of Through the Looking Glass,” which—much like chapter eight 
of The World Is Round—consists of a single sentence: “it really was a kitten 
after all” (Carroll 205; Derrida, Animal 7). Derrida goes on to say that if he 
had time to do so, he would of course have liked to “inscribe [his] whole 
talk within a reading of Lewis Carroll.” And then, more alarmingly still, he 
adds: “In fact you can’t be certain that I am not doing that, for better or 
for worse, silently, unconsciously, or without your knowing” (7). What in 
the world are we to make of this? Is he really talking about his cat or isn’t 
he?
Let us recall that Derrida’s approach to the question of the animal re-
volves around the supposed inability of animals to respond in the proper sense 
of the word. Alice’s frustration with her kittens concerns the monotony of 
their responses to her questions: “How can you talk with a person if they 
always say the same thing?” (Carroll 206; Derrida, Animal 8). But what is 
it that Alice wants to know? Having awoken from her dream to discover 
that the Red Queen “really was a kitten after all,” Alice sets about trying 
to determine first of all who or what, in the real world, corresponds to the 
strange cast of characters she had encountered in the heterotopia on the other 
side of the mirror. This proves difficult, and so she demands that the kitten 
“confess” (206) to having turned into the Red Queen. But since the kitten 
only purrs, it is impossible for Alice to know for certain, and quickly her al-
legorical reading of the text begins to unravel, to the point when she isn’t sure 
whether it was she who dreamed it all, or whether they had all been trapped 
inside the dream of the Red King, whose true identity, moreover, remains a 
mystery. It is not too difficult to discern in Alice’s insistent questioning an 
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analogue to a certain mode of literary criticism, in which the critic demands 
to know what the cat “really” stands for. And then, when the cat invariably 
refuses to spill the beans, this is chalked up to an inability on the animal’s 
part. This, in turn, serves only to reaffirm the assurance that it “really was a 
kitten after all”—since the defining characteristic of kittens is that they do not 
respond.
Importantly, as Derrida notes at the beginning of the second part of his 
lecture, this basic irresponsibility aligns the kitten with writing in general, 
and literature in particular:
What is terrible (deinon) about writing, Socrates says, is the fact that, like painting 
(zōgraphia), the things it engenders, although similar to living things (ōs zōnta), do 
not respond. No matter what question one asks them, writings remain silent, 
keeping a most majestic silence or else always replying in the same terms, which 
means not replying. (Animal 52; cf. Dissemination 136; Phaed. 275d)
In other words, kittens are (like) texts: they always say the same thing. Der-
rida does not dispute this. It is not, after all, “a matter of ‘giving speech back’ 
to animals.” Rather, it is a matter of recognizing, as Derrida writes elsewhere, 
that nonresponse is itself a response: “One always has, one always must have, 
the right not to respond, and this liberty belongs to responsibility itself” 
(“Passions” 17). For Derrida, it is literature as an institution that guarantees, 
in principle, both “the right to say everything” (28) and simultaneously the 
right to “absolute nonresponse” (29), to a fundamental “irresponsibility,” 
whereby an author cannot be forced to answer for the things the characters 
in his works say and do. (To paraphrase Chaucer: “Thise been the cattes 
wordes, and nat myne.”) More strongly, Derrida suggests that there may even 
be a fundamental “duty of irresponsibility, a refusal to reply” to an authority, 
and that this is “perhaps the highest form of responsibility” (“Strange” 38).
Perhaps, then, by suggesting that he may in fact, secretly or unconscious-
ly, be talking about Through the Looking Glass when it seems as though he is 
talking about this particular cat, Derrida is in fact refusing to accept responsibil-
ity for the significance of his own text. After all, you can examine an animal 
to see if it is a cat—and even whether it is this or that particular cat—but you 
certainly cannot do the same for the cat in Derrida’s text. At the same time, 
in turning the decision regarding how to “hear” (entendre, also: understand) 
his speech over to his audience, in an elaborate form of epitrope, he is also 
challenging us to respond. The singularity of this cat becomes the singularity 
of literature. We must confront the possibility that we do not know what 
it means to “respond”—least of all to a nonhuman who does not speak. If 
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a cat could speak we would not understand her. It may, above all, be not 
only necessary but quite literally productive, from both a zoopoetic and an 
ecopoetic perspective, to affirm the constitutive inadequacy of any response 
we may be able to offer to the call of the other, which, as Derrida elsewhere 
reminds us, “is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices” 
(“Psyche” 47), not all of which, we hasten to add, are human.
In her discussion of what she calls “negative ecopoetics,” Kate Rigby 
notes that the recognition of the inadequacy of our response to the call of 
the more-than-human other “necessitates and affirms a plurality of voices. 
For if no one can say it all, then we are all called upon to participate in our 
own way in the ‘chorus and polyphony’ of responses,” which, moreover, 
“contains more than human voices, for which we ourselves cannot stand 
in” (438-39). “Only by insisting on the limits of the text,” she continues, “its 
inevitable falling-short as a mode of response no less than as an attempted 
mediation, can we affirm that there is, in the end, no substitute for our own 
embodied involvement with the more-than-human natural world in those 
places where we ourselves stray, tarry, and, if we are lucky, dwell” (440). 
6. Subjunctive
The word “world” and its cognates (Welt, wereld, veröld) derives from the 
Proto-Germanic root wer, meaning “man” (still present in words like “were-
wolf” and “virile”), and -ald, meaning “age” (still present in “old”). Liter-
ally, then, “world” means “age of man”—hence one might say that there 
is no need for the concept of the Anthropocene, as it is already implicit in 
“world,” both in terms of its anthropocentrism and, more interestingly, in the 
fact that it denotes a time rather than a place. As has been pointed out, the 
term “Anthropocene” is nonsensical both etymologically and conceptually: 
if Holocene means “wholly recent,” Anthropocene must mean something 
like “human-recent”; moreover, as Dana Luciano observes, “the decision 
to bring this epoch [the Holocene] to an end would mark the present as a 
peculiar time, after the recent, a time out of time in more than one sense” (n. 
pag.). The time is not just out of joint; it is running out. The “world” would 
thus seem to name a series of disjunctures between incompatible conceptions 
of what is “the case.” Despite its anthropocentric denomination, this new 
“age of man” also marks a heightened awareness of our entanglement and 
codependence, of the fact that we share a terrestrial time and space with 
other creatures and forms of life, each of which have their own Umwelten 
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and hence their own worlds. “World” is thus both singular and plural: there 
is only one, and there is an infinite variety, each tied to a different mode 
of being-in-the-world, which is also simultaneously a form of being-with. I 
would like to suggest that one of the main tasks facing both zoopoetics and 
ecopoetics is to interrogate the interstices of these two senses of “world”—as 
something that is simply there but that at the same time cannot simply be 
taken for granted, something that we must actively work to produce, at least 
if we want to conceive of the world as something we have in common with 
other forms of life on this planet.
Perhaps this may help us to understand the enigmatic shift from the 
indicative to the subjunctive in Rose’s question: “If the world is round, 
would a lion fall off.” In his lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 
Heidegger notoriously posited that “the animal is poor in world,” in contrast 
to man, who is “world-forming” (177). For Heidegger, the animal’s mode of 
being-in-the-world is not a being-there (Da-sein), because, he claims, the animal 
does not have a relation to the world as such. To which Wittgenstein might 
quite reasonably respond, “How do you know?” And, conversely, as Der-
rida asks at the end of The Animal that Therefore I Am, how do you know that 
man has a relation to the world “as such” (160)? Is there even such a thing 
as the world as such? Do humans and nonhumans inhabit the same world, 
or is there a separate world for cats, for example, that is entirely separate 
from the world inhabited by humans? In his final seminar, Derrida proposes 
three seemingly incompatible answers to this question: On the one hand, he 
says, incontestably, humans and animal do inhabit the same world, the same 
physical space. On the other hand, and equally incontestably, animals and 
humans do not inhabit the same world, “for the human world will never be 
purely and simply identical to the world of animals” (Beast 8). Ultimately, 
however, neither answer is satisfactory, for, Derrida insists, neither the unity 
nor disunity of the world or worlds is simply “natural” (8); both are in fact 
constructs, and any community of worlds, whether between humans or 
nonhumans or both, must first seek to overcome the gap, the unbridgeable 
space “between my world and any other world.” In fact, Derrida writes, 
“[t]here is no world, there are only islands” [Il n’y a pas de monde, il n’y a que 
des îles] (9). And yet, we carry on “as if we were inhabiting the same world” 
(268). This as if, which brings the world into the world, is an act of poiesis: 
“[W]hat I must do, with you and carrying you, is make it that there be pre-
cisely a world, just a world,… as cats, to make as if there were just a world,… 
as though there ought to be a world where presently there is none, to make 
the gift or present of this as if come up poetically” (268). Thus, as Michael 
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Naas comments, it is “as if  there were a performative as if lodged within all 
our constative assertions and reassuring statements about the world, a comme 
si at the heart of every claim that the world is comme ça” (58). In other words, 
the subjunctive precedes the indicative—the lion’s hypothetical fall comes 
before whatever is “the case” [der Fall]—and every “world” is contingent upon 
the possibility of other worlds, even ones in which a lion would not fall off. 
Perhaps the prerogative of “world-forming” can thus be reinterpreted as an 
obligation, a joint venture, which necessarily involves both humans and 
nonhumans in the shared co-creation of the world. Such an undertaking 
would thus be both zoo- and eco-poetic. Il n’y a pas de monde is itself a version 
of Il n’y a pas de hors-texte, and hence of Il n’y a pas de chats. Which is to say, 
there is nothing that is simply “the case.” The subjunctive is all; the world is 
something we must create. We carry on as if there were a world, just as we 
proceed as if there were cats. Only then can “our” world be sound.
=^..^=
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